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There Goes the Neighborhood?
 “Residential Pruning” and the 
Good Life in Downey
G. Aron Ramirez
A 2015 Los Angeles Times article highlighted Latino achievements 
in Downey, a suburb southeast of Downtown Los Angeles. The article 
dubbed Downey the “Mexican Beverly Hills,” which aroused surprising-
ly-mixed emotions among residents, like myself. The Mexican Beverly 
Hills, though, has only recently become Mexican; until the late 1980s, 
most Downey residents were Anglo middle-class suburbanites living in 
the last white space in increasingly-Latino Southeast Los Angeles.1 In the 
span of less than a decade, Downey matched the ethnic profile of neigh-
boring suburbs, but its population retained an important characteristic: 
through the racial transformation, Downey residents were still over-
whelmingly middle-class. 
This change did not occur by chance. The Downey residents, city 
council, and especially City Manager Gerald Caton, enacted economically 
discriminatory policies to ensure that incoming ethnic Mexican home-
owners conformed to a high middle-class standard, a practice that I term 
“residential pruning.” I employ this label for a number of reasons. City 
government policies were strict but not inflexible; families of lower-class 
means did move in, and apartment complexes replaced single-family 
homes in parts of the city, much to residents’ and government’s chagrin. 
But residential pruning was how the city government shaped the incom-
ing populace into the ideal middle-class suburb - including the Anglo one 
the Mexicans replaced. Thus, the city government used residential prun-
ing with similar goals to, say, garden pruning, which enhances the image 
of a neighborhood. I do wish to note, however, that residential pruning 
was no less a form of discrimination; families swere nonetheless excluded 
from settling or staying in Downey.
Surprisingly, economic discrimination existed separately from racial 
1Note: Throughout this essay, I use the terms “Mexican,” “Mexican American”, 
and “ethnically Mexican” interchangeably. In this context, I use the terms to refer 
to the Downey homeowners of Mexican ancestry who constituted the Downey 
social structure. I also use “white” and “Anglo” interchangeably to mean an 
American of English or other white European descent.
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discrimination. Standard American historiography intertwines race 
and class to constitute different levels of societal exclusion. The case of 
Downey, however, challenges this assumption. Residential pruning by 
Caton and the city council, for the most part, holds ethnic composition 
constant – in this case, mostly Mexican. That economic discrimination 
nonetheless existed at the active and passive behest of the city government 
suggests an independence and separation of class and race.
Caton and the city council maintained Downey’s middle-class status 
because of residential pruning through ordinances that could only be 
met by affluent homeowners. The municipal code screened out residents 
who couldn’t participate in the single-family-detached-home standards 
required of American suburbanites. Residential pruning worked, too: in 
the context of concurrent economic decline in surrounding suburbs with 
similar demographic changes, Gerald Caton and the city council found 
a means, as the city motto would imply, of keeping Downey’s “future 
unlimited.”
---
 Downey developed like nearly every other settlement in early Los 
Angeles. Until European contact, fertile land nestled between the San 
Gabriel mountains sustained a modest population of the Gabrielino tribe. 
Europeans first settled in the Los Angeles basin with the establishment of 
the San Gabriel mission in 1771, and began to proselytize and convert 
the indigenous people. The Spanish mission system was transferred to the 
Mexican Republic following its independence, and in 1833, the Mexican 
Secularization Act seized mission properties and privatized the lands. To 
encourage settlement in Alta California, the Mexican government contin-
ued the Spanish practice of granting permanent land titles to prominent 
men who promised to populate the state. Manuel Nieto, a former soldier 
stationed in Alta California, received a land grant from the Spanish in 
1784 for land near the San Gabriel River, and profited from raising cattle 
and farming small crops; upon his death, Nieto was one of the richest 
Mexicans in Alta California, and he passed his valuable property down to 
his family.2
Settlers began exploring the San Gabriel Valley after the Mexi-
can-American War and subsequent cession of California to the United 
States. John Gately Downey, an Irish immigrant who served as governor 
of California and operated a successful (if exploitative) railroad partner-
2Charles Quinn Russell, History of Downey: The Life Story of a Pioneer 
Community, and of the Man Who Founded It – California Governor John Gately 
Downey – From Covered Wagon to the Space Shuttle, (Downey, California: Downey 
City Printing Office, 1973), 17. Cf. with Albert Camarillo, Chicanos in a 
Changing Society: From Mexican Pueblos to American Barrios in Santa Barbara and 
Southern California, 1848-1930, (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University 
Press, 1979) for a similar history focused on Santa Barbara, the focal point of 
contemporary Mexican society.
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ship, purchased land formerly of the Nieto grant.3 The Central Pacific 
Railroad established a railroad depot and the settlement became known 
as Downey. Agricultural-minded Americans farmed the fertile land in 
Downey, planting small crops like alfalfa before striking orange gold with 
citrus groves that were profitable enough to create a stable economic back-
bone for the nascent community. By the time of the Depression, farms 
made up most of Downey’s landscape, dotted by the occasional self-built 
home.4
Downey took on a distinctly suburban flavor following World War 
II, in part because of realtors. Residents, nearly all of whom were white, 
purchased properties from realtors selling tract homes built rapidly over 
the orange groves.5 By 1956, nearly 85,000 residents lived in Downey 
neighborhoods protected by racially-restrictive covenants that prohibited 
resale of properties to undesirable neighbors – anyone who wasn’t white 
and middle class. Not unlike in other American suburbs of the 1950s, re-
altors in Downey were on the defensive following the 1948 United States 
Supreme Court decision in Shelley v. Kraemer, which ruled race-restrictive 
covenants in deeds legally unenforceable. Not unlike in other American 
suburbs, either, Downey realtors adapted: in place of the explicitly racial 
discrimination, deeds prohibited resale that would threaten the integrity 
and property values of the neighborhood. This discrimination was made 
possible by the Federal Housing Authority’s real-estate appraisal system 
which distinguished property values and loan risks based on a four-color 
system: green for the best, purple for good, yellow for fair, red for risky 
(which was almost always reserved for areas where minorities lived).6 For 
that reason, the small population of Japanese and Mexican field workers 
who lived in Downey were, as federal loan survey documents showed, “a 
detrimental influence.”7
James Stamps spearheaded the move for incorporation in the 1950s. 
A former beet farmer whose family at one point owned over one hundred 
3Russell, History of Downey, 23.
4For a similar discussion regarding early settlers and self-built homes in Southeast 
Los Angeles, see Becky Nicolaides, My Blue Heaven: Life and Politics in the 
Working-Class Suburbs of Los Angeles, 1920-1965 (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 2002), chapter 1, which details the early history of South Gate, a suburb 
on Downey’s eastern border.
5  Kenneth Jackson, Crabgrass Frontier: The Suburbanization of the United States 
(New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1985), 125-126.
6  “Home Owners Loan Corporation appraisal of central-north Downey 
1939,” Los Angeles City Survey Files, Area Descriptions, Home Owners Loan 
Corporation, Record Group 317 (National Archives: Washington, D.C., 1939), 
doc. C-136. My thanks to Eric Avila of UCLA for pointing me to this website, 
an interactive tool that overlays HOLC appraisals over modern maps.
7  Many works have studied racially-restrictive covenants in suburban housing, 
but Jackson’s Crabgrass Frontier is perhaps the most convincing in its thorough 
treatment of the subject.
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acres of Downey land, Stamps’ roots in the community ran deep.8 Stamps, 
though, was born in Arkansas and moved to Downey at an early age along 
with other California-bound southern farmers. With him, like with most 
of the earlier travelers, came a transplanted Southern conservative political 
culture that grew well in the farming communities of Southeast Los An-
geles.9 His efforts for incorporation were motivated by keeping Downey 
an “All-American City” – indeed, Anglo American – as incorporation 
campaign posters showed.10 Stamps drafted most of the city charter and 
ordinances required for incorporation by the State of California. Downey 
residents voted to incorporate in 1956 (after a failed campaign two years 
earlier) and created the City of Downey. The city council adopted Stamps’ 
charter and nominated close friend Oren L. King to serve as the first city 
manager to execute Stamps’ vision.11
Stamps obsessed over maintaining neighborhood property values in 
the original ordinances. For example, Article V of the municipal code, 
concerned with sanitation, states its intent and purpose as:
8  Russell, History of Downey, 194.
9  For an example of transplanted southern conservative politics, see Nicolaides, 
My Blue Heaven, chaps. 5-6.
10  Larry Latimer, Downey (Mount Pleasant, South Carolina: Arcadia Publishing, 
2010), 29.
11  “Downey Wins! New City OK’d,” Downey Champion, December 18, 1956.
Figure 1: Proposed boundaries for the City of Downey, used for incorporation 
campaigns in 1956 (Image courtesy of the Downey Historical Society)
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“[t]o define as public nuisances and violations those conditions 
and uses of land that are offensive or annoying to the senses, 
detrimental to property values and community appearance…[t]
o develop regulations that will promote the sound maintenance 
of property and …[t]o establish administrative procedures for the 
City’s use, upon its election, to correct or abate violations of this 
Chapter on real property throughout the City.”12
Stamps wrote the code to purportedly protect property values, which 
seems to be a reasonable, if oddly placed, intent for the section concerning 
sanitation. But “property values” appeared throughout the entire munici-
pal code. The stated purpose for “landscaping, lighting, and walls” was to 
“[c]reate an atmosphere of orderly development and uniformly pleasant 
and attractive surroundings in the City to enhance, conserve, and stabilize 
property values.”13 And as one historian has argued, few forces rival the 
effectiveness of unified and politically-motivated Los Angeles suburban 
homeowners.14 The capital required to purchase a Downey home was 
steep enough to incite fierce protection of those property values, and 
the municipal code provisions, in more sections than one, uphold and 
enhance those investments.
These provisions were racially motivated. Per Federal Housing Au-
thority policy, areas inhabited by minorities were riskier loans. As private 
loan companies read the federal maps and based their loan decisions 
off the FHA’s four-tiered system, companies began avoiding mixed-race 
neighborhoods, regardless of whether or not they used the FHA’s loan 
protection policies.15 Anglo suburbanites, predicated on maintaining ra-
cial homogeneity, then found a numerically-proven excuse for racist moti-
vations: protecting neighborhood property values.16 Such covert language 
was generally unnecessary before 1948; before the decision in Shelley v. 
Kraemer, racially-restrictive covenants legally excluded unwanted ethnic 
groups, since homes were private property and manageable solely by deed 
owners. Following the 1948 ruling, though, Anglo homeowners sought 
a different, enforceable method to control who populated the suburbs. It 
was not uncommon for real estate deeds to include provisions prevent-
ing the resale of houses to homeowners who, because of institutionalized 
penalties for mixed-race neighborhoods, jeopardized property values – in 
12  Downey, California, Municipal Code, Article V, Chapter 9, Part I.
13Downey Municipal Code, Article IX, Chapter 5, Part II. 
14Mike Davis, City of Quartz: Excavating the Future in Los Angeles (London: Verso, 
1990), chapter 3.
15Jackson, Crabgrass Frontier, 190-218.
16 For more on suburban preference for racial homogeneity, see Jackson, Crabgrass 
Frontier, passim.
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practice, an ethnically undesirable homeowner.17 Given how Downey 
remained a racially homogeneous suburb past 1948, one can presume 
Stamps’ intent in protecting property values.
Downey’s tax base sustained its impressive growth in the 1950s and 
1960s. Originally based on agriculture, Downey, like other Los Angeles 
suburbs, attracted real estate and oil investors. Speculators poured into 
Downey as the oil reserves flowed out, but Downey became a recognizable 
place for further investment. E.M. Smith, an oil speculator looking to 
venture into the 1920s aviation fad, purchased a lot in central Downey 
and converted it into an airstrip. Emsco Aircraft, cleverly substituted for 
the E.M. Smith Company, struggled financially through the Depression 
and interwar years, but found fortune when it secured federally-guaran-
teed postwar aerospace construction contracts. The contracts were hardly 
indefinite, but Downey’s aerospace plant constantly won new projects. 
With the onset of the Cold War and the Space Age in the 1950s and 
17See Camarillo, “A New Frontier in America’s Cities of Color,” and Sides, LA 
City Limits, 102.
Figure 2: Pro-incorporation groups mailed pamphlets like these to advocate for 
local control of services. This culture of local control allowed residential pruning 
to flourish. (Image courtesy of the Downey Historical Society).
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1960s, Downey had at least one major, stable source of tax revenue to en-
sure development of roads, facilities, and general upkeep of the suburban 
lifestyle.18 Small white-collar companies moved into Downey, which by 
then had earned a reputation as a safe place to live and do business – for 
the white middle-class residents who could move in.
But small populations of immigrant Japanese, Greek, Cuban, and 
Mexicans did live in primarily-Anglo Downey.19 These groups lived in 
residentially-segregated less-desirable parts of Downey, and their presence 
in turn harmed property values.20 In general, though, immigrant popu-
lations in the 1950s and 1960s were limited in number and were legally 
prevented from the social mobility available to their Anglo counterparts 
throughout the city.
By the 1980s, the white population in Downey was mostly at odds 
with the demographic profile of contemporary Southeast Los Angeles. Be-
ginning in 1965 following the Watts Riots, Anglo Americans moved out 
of the formerly-restricted suburbs like Compton and Bell Gardens at a 
pace so rapid, one historian has called it the “White Exodus.”21 Unscrupu-
lous realtors, of minority and Anglo backgrounds, aided the demographic 
transition through blockbusting practices, where they warned white 
homeowners that the value of their property would decrease with the 
influx of non-white residents; the Anglo homeowners usually sold quickly, 
padding the realtors’ pockets.22 By 1980, suburbs that were previously 
“lily-white” and mostly upper-working-class were populated by black and 
Mexican homeowners of increasingly lower-working-class backgrounds.23 
With time, the former prestige of the Southeast LA suburbs was replaced 
18Gerald A. Blackburn, Downey’s Aerospace History, 1947-1999 (Mount Pleasant, 
South Carolina: Arcadia Publishing, 2009), passim.
19For a Cuban perspective on minority communities in Downey, see Mario 
A. Guerra, Embracing Change: An Immigrant Saga (Bloomington, Indiana: 
Archway Publishing, 2017), 22-24. His story, though, is atypical: as a light-
skinned Cuban immigrant, earning citizenship was easier and quicker than for a 
Mexican immigrant because of the Cuban Adjustment Act (1966), which gives 
Cubans permanent residency after one year of physically residing in the United 
States. That, and his light skin complexion, inform his discussions about living 
and working in the United States, and make his case different from the typical 
experiences Mexicans faced.
20See note 8
21  Albert Camarillo, “Cities of Color: The Making of California’s Minority-
Majority Cities,” Pacific Historical Review 76, no.1 (February 2007), 10.
22  Albert Camarillo, “A New Racial Frontier in America’s Cities of Color: 
Reflections on Minority-Majority Cities – the Case of Compton, California,” in 
Hazel Markus and Paula M. L. Moya, Doing Race: 21 Essays for the 21st Century 
(New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2010).
23  Jerry Gonzalez, In Search of the Mexican Beverly Hills: Latino Suburbanization 
in Postwar Los Angeles (New Brunswick, New Jersey: Rutgers University Press, 
2018), 7-8.
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by notoriety, and the cities’ reputations worsened, giving rise to Compton 
as the “Murder Capital of the World” in the 1980s. Downey, then, was 
the Anglo middle-class holdover of a different style of suburbia.24
Downey stayed white longer than nearby cities because homeowners 
felt no such pressure to escape until the late 1980s. With their own police 
force, fire department, school district, and city council, residents main-
tained remarkable control over city functions. Facing little pressure to in-
tegrate the schools, Anglo parents prided themselves on maintaining their 
standard of living – at least until the next best option became available. As 
one historian demonstrated, by 1980, white homeowners looking to resist 
school integration moved en masse to Orange County, whose population 
boomed in the 1960s and the 1980s, developing “the county’s identity 
as a haven for whites concerned about states-rights, property-rights, and 
‘traditional’ values.”25 Indeed, cities like Yorba Linda, Newport Beach, 
and Irvine offered Downey homeowners similar middle-class autonomous 
suburban lives without Downey’s geographic proximity to minority-ma-
jority cities.
For this reason, Anglo homeowners began moving away from 
Downey in the 1980s.26 By this point, realtors realized the inevitable 
demographic changes and began selling to Mexican Americans who 
could afford to move in. In place of the Anglo residents moved mostly 
Mexican-origin homeowners, as was mostly the case with Norwalk, Pico 
Rivera, Paramount, and South Gate, the four suburbs to every direction 
of Downey. Unlike the surrounding suburbs, though, Downey’s prestige 
didn’t decline. 
Perhaps a consideration of the 1990s tax base would help explain 
Downey’s divergence. As previously mentioned, federally-contracted 
aerospace companies almost continuously occupied the Downey plant. 
Throughout the 1960s, Downey-based firms constructed parts of the 
Apollo 11, and worked on similar projects through the Reagan-era in-
crease in defense spending. By the 1990s, the contracts were sparse and 
the labor force at Rockwell, then the occupier of the Emsco plant, was 
only a quarter of what it was during its earlier heyday.27 Starting in the 
1960s, amidst Southeast Los Angeles’s demographic transition, Anglo 
24  The following two paragraphs are speculation that I have based on my 
initial working with the subject matter, primary sources, and knowledge of 
contemporary forces. I see understanding this as crucial to understanding 
Downey’s Mexican development.  
25  Jack Schneider, “Escape from Los Angeles: White Flight from Los Angeles and 
its Schools, 1960-1980,” Journal of Urban History 34, no. 6 (September 2008): 
995-1012, 1005.
26  United States Bureau of the Census, 1990 Census of Popuation, Volume 1, 
Chapter A, Part 6 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2002). 
Cf. with Census of 1970 and 1980.
27  Blackburn, Downey’s Aerospace History, 78.
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business owners took stores with them as they moved out of cities like 
Compton and South Gate, leaving emptied stores that were infrequently 
replaced. In turn, this weakened the cities’ tax bases.28 This phenomenon 
also affected Downey businesses in the 1980s, though not to the same 
extent.29 Unlike in other cities, the outgoing Anglo-owned stores were 
almost equally replaced by incoming ethnic businesses: for every “Covey 
Auto Parts” that left, a “Luis Carniceria” moved in.30 This must have hap-
pened differently from other cities because of the perception of Downey 
as a safe place to do business; as a city with low crime rates, its own police 
force, favorable business policies, and especially a target demographic for 
ethnic businesses, it was safer for business owners to move to Downey 
than other cities like Compton. Prospective homeowners saw middle-class 
Mexicans moving into Downey, and cultural familiarity attracted other 
Mexican-origin residents. Downey’s federal-aerospace-supported tax base 
helped the city through the 1980s as Anglo-owned businesses left and 
ethnic ones established their roots. As these businesses set up in Downey, 
further strengthening the tax base, the city not only avoided economic 
decline, but strengthened its prestige and reputation as a middle-class 
suburb for Mexicans.
---
The city council hired Gerald Caton in 1989 as the contours of 
Mexican middle-class Downey began taking shape. By then, Caton and 
the city council focused their efforts on excluding an economic - not 
racial - demographic. Caton’s government utilized political and legal 
means to exclude and maintain Downey’s middle-class status during rapid 
demographic transition. When Gerald Caton became city manager in 
1989, he had a reputation for effective city governance. Caton took the 
job as a thirty-eight-year-old with a stellar reputation after “injecting new 
life” as city manager into Cudahy, a nearby Latino working-class suburb. 
Caton’s success stemmed primarily from his penchant for recruiting rede-
velopment projects that converted unused or underused properties into 
28  Camarillo, “A New Racial Frontier in America’s Cities of Color”; Nicolaides, 
My Blue Heaven, especially chapter 6 and conclusion; Josh Sides, LA City Limits: 
African American Los Angeles from the Great Depression to the Present (Berkeley and 
Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2003), 210-216. Not all Los Angeles 
suburbs experienced businesses leaving with their owners, though. George 
Sanchez discusses in “‘What’s Good for Boyle Heights is Good for the Jews’: 
Creating Multiracialism on the Eastside during the 1950s,” American Quarterly 
56, no. 3 (September 2004): 633-661, for an example of Jewish business owners 
in Boyle Heights who kept their businesses in the city despite moving their 
houses to other cities. That was atypical, and likely not the case in Downey, but 
it shouldn’t be ruled out because certain law firms did retain their services despite 
owners moving out.
29  My analysis here is based on business listings in Downey City Directory (Los 
Angeles: Los Angeles Directory Company) from 1950 and 1992.
30  Ibid.
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successful commercial centers. Caton, in his new Downey job, worked 
with an operating budget ten times larger than in Cudahy.31 Caton quick-
ly got to work, putting forth revisions to the city ordinances twelve times 
in his first three years, from rules as politically pertinent as “powers and 
duties of the board” to areas as obscure as “equipment funds.”32 Gerald 
Caton knew of the language in Downey’s municipal code and showed 
interest in revising it. That he left certain parts untouched suggests he was 
comfortable with the way they contributed to his vision for Downey as an 
emerging Mexican Beverly Hills.
This requires a brief discussion of the city’s political structure: the 
council-manager system. Five councilmembers elect from amongst them-
selves a representative of the council, the mayor, who serves as the ceremo-
nial head of the city. The mayor, unlike in a council-mayor format, has no 
executive function; the charter vaguely assigns the mayor “responsibility 
for interpreting the policies, programs, and needs of the City govern-
ment to the people.” Those policies, though, are determined by the city 
manager. The city manager is chosen by city councilmembers and serves 
for as long as the council chooses. Gerald Caton essentially was chosen, 
with minor help from the mayor and city councilmembers, to maintain 
Downey’s prestige. Caton and the Downey government certainly benefit-
ed from working with a framework of city ordinances created to exclude 
minorities.
 The municipal code indicates which rules have been revised, added, 
or amended. Some ordinances are entirely removed, and will be noted 
as such in subsequent editions. Appended text (such as “Added by Ordi-
nance X, adopted MM/DD/YY”) indicates which codes have and haven’t 
been revised since the original 1956 municipal code. Just because their 
text has not changed, though, does not mean their interpretation has not.
In fact, framework that protected property values by excluding 
minorities before 1980 was kept afterward to restrict non-middle-class 
homeowners from moving to Downey. Of the hundreds of mentions 
throughout the entire city ordinances, less than twenty had been removed 
or substantially revised.33 It would be difficult to assume, though, later 
politicians’ knowledge of these racial motivations for such language, since 
Downey’s first Latino councilmember took office in 1985, by when city 
government would not have used “property value” language to restrict 
31  Kondo and Harris, “Downey Picks Cudahy Chief as City Manager.”
32  My claim is also based on an analysis of the municipal code, which contains 
each revision made to the ordinances. To determine the twelve ordinances in 
Caton’s first three years, I scanned the edited ordinances, looking for edits 
that took place in late 1989 until 1992. This period was especially productive, 
averaging four major revisions a year; later years averaged about a major revision a 
year, which is evidence of Caton’s enthusiasm for changing the municipal code to 
maintain Downey’s middle-class status.
33  This claim is based on my analysis of the municipal code.
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Mexicans from moving in.34 In general, though, I have noticed a serious 
disconnect between the rosy history the city portrays, and the reality of 
older generations of Downey.35 Therefore it would be hard to conclude 
whether or not the city council knew of racial implications of “property 
34  The first Latino mayor was Ernesto Davila, mayor in 1985-1986. See 
City of Downey website, http://downey-v1002.civica.granicusops.com/_
blobcache/0000/0007/6571.pdf, accessed on 22 November 2017.
35  For example, in 2016, the City celebrated its 60th anniversary of incorporation 
and decorated the streets with signs showing old pictures of Downey, setting 
up “historical exhibits,” and publishing brief vignettes of life in Old Downey. 
Nearly every discussion of Downey history involved bragging about the aerospace 
industry and Downey’s role as the “cradle of the space age,” but there was a 
surprising absence of discussion – or even acknowledgement of – Downey’s 
discriminatory past. This amnesia trickles down to the Downey Historical 
Society, whose holdings represent the history of Downey as white residents 
have experienced it. What’s more, the city library has two books of the history 
of Downey, one published in 1932 that glamorizes John Downey’s exploitation 
and the fierce removal of Gabrielino “Indians,” and a 1973 history that, being 
published before Mexican Americans moved to Downey in significant numbers, 
ignores the role of early Hispanic residents, and resorts mostly to advertising-
friendly tropes to give a mythological telling of Downey’s history. This gap 
between what Downey thinks it knows about its history and what Downey really 
knows about its history motivates my research.
Figure 3: Gerald Caton, Downey’s city manager from 1989-2011, at the aero-
space facility that, once closed, became the Downey Landing shopping center. 
(Image courtesy of the Downey Historical Society).
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value” language. It is not, however, difficult to understand the meaning of 
“property value” language in 1990s Downey.
Caton used the property value language framework for residential 
pruning. The landscaping requirements in Downey’s municipal code 
provide one such example. The city code forbade reasonably offensive 
appearances like broken windows or vegetation that promotes fire hazards, 
which protected homeowners from damage or harm caused by inflamed 
lawns or scattered glass.36 Some requirements, however, made less sense. 
Technical charts fill the “Landscaping Requirements” section that man-
date:
“Except in the R-1 and R-2 zones, the total number of trees 
required shall be as follows:
One (1) tree for every five (5) parking spaces; and One (1) tree 
for every twenty (20) linear feet of street (including street side) 
frontage… Except in the R-1 and R-2 zones, the size of trees, at 
time of planting, shall be as required in Table 9.5.4.”37
 
Or, that homeowners must provide:
“[a] colorful landscape edge [that] should be established at the 
base of buildings. Avoid asphalt edges at the base of structures as 
much as possible. Plant materials located in containers are appro-
priate… Planting masses on-site should assume a simple, non-
uniform arrangement. The diversity of massing types should be 
great enough to provide interest, but kept to a level that evokes a 
relaxed natural feeling.”38
 
One historian has written about suburban sounds and styles evoca-
tive of nature, from names like Chicago’s Forest Park or New York’s Gar-
den City, to the commonly tree-laden streets.39 In this case, Downey pol-
iticians, including Caton, maintained Stamps’ original aesthetic to ensure 
the continuation of classic-looking homes. Conformity, not flexibility, 
was required. But these requirements were also prohibitive on two levels: 
initial cost and cost of maintenance. For new developers, compliance with 
ordinances, especially fanciful tree and sightly vegetation requirements, 
could add significant costs. By design, then, the owners who invested in 
Downey needed to be of secure-enough means to afford such auxiliary re-
quirements. The cost of maintenance similarly prohibited certain property 
owners. For front lawns, prohibitions included:
36  Downey Municipal Code, Article V, Chapter 9, Subsection 2.
37  Downey Municipal Code Article IX, Chapter 5, Part II.
38  Downey Municipal Code, Article IX, Chapter 5, Part II, Subsection 4.
39  For more on the politics of nomenclature, see Jackson, Crabgrass Frontier, 
especially chap. 4 and chap. 8.
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“Vegetation causing detriment to neighboring properties, or that 
is out of conformity with neighboring community standards to 
such an extent as to result in, or contribute to, a diminution of 
property values, including, but not limited to: Lawns with grass 
in excess of six inches (6’’) in height; Hedges, trees, lawns, plants, 
or other vegetation that are not maintained in a neat, orderly, and 
healthy manner as a result of lack of adequate mowing, groom-
ing, trimming, pruning, fertilizing, watering, and/or replace-
ment.”40
 
Maintenance needed to be taken almost weekly, lest a lawn grow 
more than a disorderly six inches. Thus, a family moving into Downey 
needed to allocate, on a weekly basis, either hours of their day or mon-
etary pay to service and maintain their vegetation. Such costs added up 
to a significant yearly investment, and restricted homeowners to those of 
particular means. White racial homogeneity was implied in Downey’s ear-
lier years, but in the 1990s Caton left these codes unedited to shape and 
prune incoming residents by economic, rather than racial, terms.
 These codes were not without teeth: penalties meted out by the city 
swiftly and reliably enforced the codes in 1990s Downey. An edit by Ca-
ton increased penalties: $100 for a first offense, $200 for a second offense 
within 12 months, and $500 for a third offense. Failure to pay on-time 
resulted in a late fee that doubled the cost; failure to pay the compounded 
citation within sixty days results in added administrative fees and variable 
interest rates.41 One could very well end up paying over $1,000 for having 
a lawn that grows over six inches, according to these regulations. And the 
city enforced them: a letter in the local newspaper, the Downey Eagle, 
complained about the zeal with which Downey officers wrote tickets for 
municipal code violations. Erroneously charging the mayor for the stricter 
penalties, one citizen wrote:
“Under the new plan you are fined first and then are required to 
correct the violation. With the change in the Charter, the code 
enforcement officers will be like ‘Big Brother’…Is the purpose of 
Amendment #6 to increase the revenue for the City of Downey 
by issuing more citations, resulting in collecting more money? Or 
is the purpose to control and micro-manage the daily lives of the 
citizens? Or both?”42
 
40  Downey Municipal Code, Article V, Chapter 9, Subsection 2.
41  Downey Municipal Code, Article I, Chapter 4, Part VI.
42  Guy Sterner, “Citation Threat,” Downey Eagle, October 1, 1993. The city 
has also been notorious for very strict enforcement of parking violations due to 
street sweeping, with similar fee schedules for those violations, even to cars not 
registered to Downey homeowners.
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Living in Downey in the 1990s was prohibitively expensive for 
residents without the means to afford the middle-class suburban lifestyle, 
and that ensured Caton’s use of the municipal code would keep Downey a 
middle-class suburb.
However, there were few other arrangements if home-owning 
proved to be too expensive. The next-best option would be renting 
a home, which offered access to Downey’s reputable neighborhoods, 
police services, and school district.43 Middle-class suburbanites, though, 
have historically seen rental housing as anathema to the suburban ideal, 
since semi-permanent or temporary housing begets transience and loose 
attachments to suburban neighborhoods.44 Of course, Stamps’ municipal 
code restricted this type of housing and Caton left that framework intact 
through his revisions. Property owners looking to subdivide their lots into 
apartments were responsible for fees related to the conversion, calculated 
by a multifaceted equation that charged developers based on the proposed 
number of units, as well as a yearly fee based on the age and size of the 
complex.45 In sum, the municipal code as effected by Stamps made it 
difficult to convert single-family properties into multi-family complexes. 
However, a 1987 revision to the municipal code by Caton’s predecessor 
rewarded such developers, likely in response to contemporary housing 
shortages in California, where:
“an applicant shall be eligible for either a density bonus or other 
incentives or concessions of equivalent financial value in accor-
dance with State law if the applicant for a conversion of existing 
rental apartments to condominiums agrees to provide thirty-three 
percent of the total units of the proposed condominium project 
as target units affordable to households with moderate incomes 
or less, or to provide fifteen percent of the total units in the 
condominium conversion project as target units affordable to 
lower-income households.”46
 
This epitomized residential pruning in Downey: flexible enough 
for working-class residents to move in, but strict enough to enhance the 
middle-class reputation. By removing semi-permanent rentals in favor of 
mortgaged condominiums, the revision signified a middle ground be-
43  I base my analysis here off the U.S. Census from 1980, 1990, and 2000, where 
rental housing had the second-highest number of Downey families.
44  For more on this, see Jackson, Crabgrass Frontier, Nicolaides, My Blue Heaven. 
See also Jerry Andrews, “Forced Public Housing is a Swelling Cancer,” Downey 
Eagle, January 21, 1994.
45  Downey Municipal Code Article IX, Chapter 5, Part X.
46  Downey Municipal Code Article IX, Chapter 5, Part XII, Subsection 14. This 
did, of course, incite backlash. See Downey Eagle op-ed below in note 47.
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tween strict economic discrimination and flexible suburbanization. This 
should not be overplayed, though. Stamps, Caton, and other Downey 
politicians enacted steep hurdles for non-single-family homes to prevent 
Downey from losing its middle-class reputation.
Through the 1990s, Caton enacted other policies to keep Downey 
middle-class. During the early 1990s economic recession, Caton followed 
strict no-lending policies for businesses and homeowners. Despite losing 
two automobile dealerships, significant sources of city revenue, “Caton 
said the city’s Redevelopment agency considered helping [a car dealership 
owner and Downey resident], but decided that ‘the risks were greater than 
the (potential) benefit to the city’.”47 Caton maintained that his policies 
were the most fiscally responsible, but doing so removed an added safety 
net for businesses or homeowners to rely on. Caton’s publically-known 
policies ensured the homeowners and business owners in Downey were 
wealthy enough to support their middle-class lifestyle, even throughout 
the recession.
Residential pruning existed beyond the city manager’s actions, 
though, and negotiations for a new freeway, the Century Freeway (I-105), 
exemplify greater currents of economic discrimination. Recent historians 
have identified freeway construction and other infrastructural improve-
ments as “suburban renewal,” methods by which suburbs clear areas of 
low-income housing (or in most cases, the people living in it).48 Through-
out Southern California, cities like Flood Plains and Santa Fe Springs 
used freeway construction plans like the San Gabriel Freeway (I-605) for 
these exact purposes, mostly displacing Mexican or African American 
families living in homes labeled by authorities as health hazards.49 The 
opportunity to evict working-class residents informed Randall Barb, the 
Downey mayor who nominated Caton, in his advocacy for construction 
of the I-105 freeway. Discussions regarding the freeway’s design began in 
earnest over a decade prior, with the proposed line running from Los An-
geles International Airport (LAX) to the larger Santa Ana Freeway (I-5). 
A major thoroughfare, Imperial Highway, made nearly this same con-
nection, running from LAX to Yorba Linda in Orange County – where 
the I-5 runs through – but freeway construction involved razing houses 
through northern Compton, southern South Gate, and southern Downey. 
The proposed plan incited opposition in these predominantly-minority 
47  Lorna Fernandes, “Auto Dealer Koosa Faces a ‘Friendly’ Foreclosure: 
Financing: Religious order hopes to acquire title of Nissan of Downey, then lease 
it back to the beleaguered owner,” Los Angeles Times, October 24, 1991.
48  See Andrew Wiese, Places of their Own: African American Suburbanization in 
the Twentieth Century (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2004) 104-109; and 
Jerry Gonzalez, In Search of the Mexican Beverly Hills, chap. 4.
49  See Gonzalez, In Search of the Mexican Beverly Hills, 116-129; and Natalia 
Molina, Fit to be Citizens?: Public Health and Race in Los Angeles, 1879-1939 
(Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2006).
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neighborhoods.50
A congressional committee met in 1984 to discuss the progress and 
planning of the freeway’s construction. Planners placed the freeway near 
Downey’s border with Paramount, which by then was a low-working-
class minority-majority suburb. Construction, therefore, could improve 
Downey’s physical image by removing houses and families that more 
closely resembled working-class Paramount than the Mexican Beverly 
Hills. Indeed, constructing the I-105 freeway physically demarcated the 
built and living environment between the two suburbs – a distinction 
that’s still visible today. The City of Downey Planning Commission 
sent mayor Barb and city councilwoman Diane Boggs – a former mayor 
herself who also approved of Caton – to testify on behalf of the city. Their 
urgency was apparent, as Mayor Barb pleaded:
“And so again, as we hear testimony and we see your interest, 
we’re encouraged that the freeway will be built and that it will 
intersect our city as it’s been designed, and that we will move for-
ward in that area. I again just would like to welcome you…And if 
50  United States Congress House Committee on Public Works and 
Transportation - Subcommittee on Surface Transportation, Progress of California 
Century Freeway (I-105) (Washington: United States Government Printing 
Office, 1985), 226-245 (especially testimony by Violet Rabaya).
Figure 4: Downey politicians in 1965 unveiling the first proposed route 
of the I-105 freeway through southern Downey. (Image courtesy of the 
Downey Historical Society).
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there’s anything we can do to help, please let us know.”51
 
Because Mayor Barb understood the implications of removing south-
ern Downey families, he wished for the project to be promptly completed. 
Residents shared the politicians’ enthusiasm for suburban renewal, too. 
City councilwoman Dianne Boggs’s family sold their home in South Gate 
a decade earlier to expedite construction. As a Downey councilwoman, 
her interests laid in maintaining a middle-class milieu that the residents 
of south Downey spoiled. In her testimony, she anxiously informed the 
project planners of “7 dwellings to be removed, 3 industrial complexes to 
be removed, 14 apartment buildings to be removed” – all anathema to a 
suburban middle-class ideal. But she also informed the committee of the 
residents’ interests in the project:
“I had occasion recently for my election to walk my district 
door to door and talk with all of the residents who are living in 
the corridor [near where the construction was supposed to take 
place]. Their concern is the immediate completion of the free-
way… because it leaves a little less place for crime and they’re 
anxious to get the freeway completed so they can get their cul-de-
sacs in.”52
 
Government and residents alike had vested interests in the freeway: 
the city council wanted demarcation between Paramount and Downey, 
and the residents wanted to “get their cul-de-sacs in” for new middle-class 
suburbanites. Gerald Caton, of course, became a staunch proponent 
of the new freeway, and welcomed its completion. By 1993, suburban 
Downey residents could commute in their cars to their white-collar jobs 
over property where, just a decade prior, lived families who didn’t fit the 
middle-class image Caton and the city council tried to maintain.
---
By 2000, Caton’s efforts succeeded in achieving Downey’s character 
and flavor as a middle-class minority-majority suburb, which it maintains 
to this day. Brief incidents of gangs moving into Downey temporarily 
threatened the city’s status in the early 2000s, but effective city-wide pro-
grams like “Gangs Out of Downey” (GOOD) quelled the threat.
Caton, ever the residential pruner, continued his middle-class-mag-
net policies. In 2003 when the Downey aerospace plant closed for good, 
Caton quickly devised a plan to redevelop empty space into a robust 
commercial center to raise property values in the neighborhood. With a 
51  United States Congress House Committee on Public Works and 
Transportation - Subcommittee on Surface Transportation, Progress of California 
Century Freeway (I-105), 5-6. 
52  Ibid, 6-7.
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quip that “[t]he community’s ego was really hurt with the closure,” Caton 
went right back to work to keep Downey the Mexican Beverly Hills.53 In 
its place went the Downey Landing, a shopping center with the Gerald 
M. Caton Fountain, and Downey Studios, a production studio where 
Iron Man and some other blockbusters were filmed.
The main difference between the Downey of the 1990s and the 
Downey of 2010s is a facelift throughout the city; the people come, if not 
from the same families, from the same backgrounds. Downey’s municipal 
codes, first written by Stamps but kept by subsequent City Governments, 
effectively fashioned its population – “residential pruning” as I have 
called it – to discriminate who could from couldn’t move in. Middle-class 
families have stayed in Downey and middle-class families have flocked to 
Downey. This is all the more astonishing in comparison to similar suburbs 
in the area: Compton, a city where middle-class blacks upgraded to en 
masse in 1960s, did not survive as a middle-class suburb when it went 
from majority-white to majority-black. The makeup of the two cities was 
largely the same in 1956, when Downey was incorporated: mostly Anglo 
middle-class white-collar workers living in a racially-segregated sleeper 
suburb.
 The 2010 Census reported that major cities in the United States like 
New York, Boston, Los Angeles, and Phoenix, had become minority-ma-
jority.54 As immigration continues, especially from Latin American coun-
tries like Mexico and El Salvador, so will the trend. As metropolitan cities 
become minority-majority, populations will look to suburbanize, not 
different from early nineteenth century suburbanization.55 Populations of 
ethnic minorities will move into suburbs that were previously all-white, 
and it is of interest to understand what projects a city to become the next 
Compton and what projects a city to become the next Downey.
I hope to take greater understandings about race and class from my 
conclusions. In standard historiography, race and class have seemed to 
work inextricably in conjunction with one another. Social historians in 
American historiography have been quick to understand class as a func-
tion or aspect of race and racial forces, as opposed to its own definite 
category. When one is subjugated to a different racial categorization, class 
opportunities are similarly limited. As one historian has shown about 
late-nineteenth-century Santa Barbara, the conjunctive inter-workings of 
race and class relegated Mexicans to low-skilled and semi-skilled occu-
53  Akilah Johnson, “Shuttle’s Loss Hits at Heart of Downey,” Los Angeles 
Times, February 5, 2003, accessed on 10 December 2017, http://articles.latimes.
com/2003/feb/05/local/me-downey5.
54  Noor Wazwaz, “It’s Official: The U.S. is Becoming a Minority-Majority 
Nation,” U.S. News and World Report, July 6, 2015, accessed December 10, 
2017, https://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2015/07/06/its-official-the-us-is-
becoming-a-minority-majority-nation.
55  See Jackson, Crabgrass Frontier, chaps. 1-4. 
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pational labor, since the Mexicans fit into the lowest rung in a racial-so-
cioeconomic-Anglo-capitalist ladder.56 While this may have held true for 
situations in which a white/non-white binary exists, the case of 1990s 
Downey suggests otherwise. In Downey, race was a controlled variable, to 
borrow social-scientific terminology, since the majority of the population 
was Mexican American – a minority by the yardstick of standard racial 
categorizations in which race and class typically function. Nonetheless, 
economic discrimination (in the form of residential pruning) existed, and 
arguably exists past the twenty-first century. Following the logic of stan-
dard historiography, race and class should work simultaneously as levels 
of discrimination. However, actions by Gerald Caton and other Downey 
politicians, as I have suggested, economically discriminated despite the 
absence of racial discrimination against Mexicans.57 Perhaps this can 
provide a framework for understanding the resource-competitive inter-mi-
nority conflicts, such as the black-brown tensions plaguing current-day 
Compton.58
But, in the case of Downey, politicians like Gerald Caton and Ran-
dall Barb used – or stayed – legal means to ensure that the Mexicans mov-
ing into Downey were of a sufficient economic background to conform to 
the economic ideals of a middle-class suburb.  Through edits and inten-
tional non-edits to the municipal code, many of them remnants from an 
era of Downey’s history predicated on racial discrimination, Caton and 
the city council enacted standards of living that only a middle-class family 
could afford. The ordinances – some with bizarre and specific regula-
tions – were enforced dutifully and with sufficient severity to prevent 
lower-class families from moving to Downey in numbers great enough 
to threaten the suburban ideal. And for those lower-class families, if they 
couldn’t afford to live in a single-family detached home, there were few 
other alternatives. It was no less a form of discrimination, but residential 
pruning was crucial in Downey’s protection of its legal means to cultivate 
a certain milieu, one that was able to maintain its luster as the Mexican 
Beverly Hills.
 
56  See Camarillo, Chicanos in a Changing Society, passim; Eric Avila, Popular 
Culture in the Age of White Flight (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of 
California Press, 2004).
57  Whether discrimination existed against other groups of color is a question I 
will address with further research.
58  See Camarillo, especially his recent works like “Cities of Color” and “A New 
Frontier in America’s Cities of Color.” I also wish to denote a difference between 
race and class as two separate functions of the structure of discrimination, and 
two separate functions of discrimination as part of one’s identity. I do not find 
the two to be mutually exclusive, meaning that a working-class Mexican can be 
discriminated in, say, Downey for his or her class position, but discriminated in, 
say Palo Alto for his or her class position and ethnic background.
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